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In this paper, I briefly discuss some information on comparisons from sources 
other than the CIA or ICP that can be brought to bear in calculating the Soviet 
Unionmnited States GDP ratio (for a discussion of CIA estimates, see Maddi- 
son  1998). The Soviet Union took part in the Comecon comparisons. These 
were conducted every five years (the last was done in 1988) and covered not 
only national income but also industrial and agricultural production and invest- 
ments in considerable detail. Of these countries, several (Poland, Yugoslavia, 
Romania, and Hungary) had also taken part in the ICP exercises in various 
years. Thus, they can serve as a bridge between the Soviet Union and, for ex- 
ample, the United States. Also, I should like to mention the special Soviet 
Union-Hungary  (1985) and Soviet Union-Germany  (1988) GDP binary com- 
parisons that were made according to the full ICP methodology, which an in- 
quisitive observer can apply as links in the Soviet Union-United  States com- 
parison. The last two comparisons were broadly consistent with the later 1990 
ICP exercise in which the Soviet Union took part for the first time. 
It seems to me, however, that a part of the problem encountered in the Soviet 
Union-United  States comparisons is of a broader methodological nature and 
is, in fact, inherent to any comparison or growth rate calculation. Moreover, 
this issue may influence the outcome of a comparison considerably more than 
deficiencies in basic numbers that arise from suspected under- or overreport- 
ing, hidden military expenditures, etc. or even quality differentials (let us call 
them red differences due to basic data). I refer here to the index number prob- 
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lem. This problem has become so acute in recent years that the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) has recently abandoned fixed-based indexes in the 
national accounts of the United States altogether. I will illustrate this assertion 
that a more fundamental core problem lurks concealed in the series by refer- 
ence to mostly U.S. numbers that may be deemed more reliable. As an addi- 
tional consideration in using U.S. numbers, it is only fair to look closely at the 
other side of the Soviet Union-United  States comparisons instead of assuming 
the U.S. numbers as given. 
10.1  Index Number Problem 
The  issue goes back  to  the  classic index  number problem. Alexander 
Gerschenkron was really the first to pay close attention to this question in com- 
parisons-across  countries and time (growth rates). In his now classic DolZur 
Index of Soviet Machinery Output (1951), he investigated not only Soviet ma- 
chinery output but also American machinery output in similar detail. His esti- 
mate, which gave rise to the term Gerschenkron effect, was based on calcula- 
tions for the American machinery industry.’ Specifically, he  estimated the 
growth of American machinery production during 1899-39  at both 1899 and 
1939 prices. His results are quoted in panelA of table 10.1. 
Gerschenkron (1951, 55) went on to state, “Clearly, in the case of formid- 
able differentials of  this sort no adjustment of  the index will do. Naturally, 
there would be nothing meaningful, let alone ‘ideal‘, about taking the square 
root of the product of  1542 and 198 [he refers here to the Fisher index, which 
is sometimes called ideal]. The difference of regimens must be accepted and 
taken into account rather than disguised by  some mode of averaging it, even 
though the result may meet certain technical tests.” Similar effects can still be 
1. The Gerschenkron effect is intrinsically  related to the Paasche-Laspeyres  spread (PLS). Let 
us define Q,  as the quantity Laspeyres index and Q, as the quantity Paasche index. Then we can 
express the PLS as 
where up,,, u~,~  = weighted variances in relative prices and quantities, and rp,q  = weighted coeffi- 
cient of correlation between price and quantity relatives. 
The expression given above simply states that the Laspeyres index exceeds the Paasche index if 
the correlation between relative price and quantity changes is negative, i.e., if  the direction of 
movements in price ratios en masse is opposite to those in quantity ratios (or most of the product 
mix are normal goods). This intuitively looks right: if technical change (or something else) makes 
products cheaper, then their consumption increases;  or, when some goods experience  a price shock, 
their consumption decreases. Moreover, it can be observed that the hypothesis of  normality of 
goods is validated by the whole experience of the ICP examining a table of the PLS compiled 
from the ICP results for different years, one can find that the PLS is always less than unity for any 
pair of countries. 
The Paasche-Laspeyres spread has a deep economic sense: all indexes allowing an economic 
interpretation  are bounded by  these two indexes, including those corresponding to nonhomothetic 
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Table 10.1  Effect of Base Year on Some US.  Manufacturing Volume Indexes 
A. Indexes and growth rates of machinery output in the United States 
during 1899-1939 (1899 = 100):” 
At 1899 prices 
At 1939 prices 
1,542 (7.1% per year) 
198 (1.7%  per year) 
B. Annual growth rates (%) of  expenditures on producers’ durable 
equipment in the United States during 1959-87:b 
At 1959 prices  26.1 
At 1987 prices  4.7 
At 1977 prices  4.7 
C. Annual growth rates (%) of  manufacturing output in the United 
States during 1977-1987:< 
At 1987 prices  1.6 
”From Gerschenkron (195  1,52). 
bFrom Young (1992, tables B and D). Young does not show the 1959-based index explicitly, but 
he does provide the corresponding  1987-based price index (-13.6  percent,  table D); the two 
together when multiplied over produce the index of nominal change (+9.0 percent). From there, 
we can find the 1959-based  quantity index as (100 + 9.0)/(100 -  13.6) = 126.1. 
‘From Young (1992,34). 
observed in the United States (only on a larger scale): discrepancies in indexes 
for the producers’ durable equipment category of the GDP are even more mani- 
fest during 1959-87.  The difference between the two indexes (the Paasche- 
Laspeyres spread) amounts to 20 percent a year in this case (see panel B of 
table 10.1). 
The examples given above probably tell us that the Gerschenkron effect has 
become even more pronounced since World War 11.  One can notice, however, 
that the time differential between the base years is forty and twenty-eight years, 
respectively. During that time, one can expect immense changes in the product 
mix and relative prices. But what would happen if the time span were smaller? 
Another example from the same source, this time concerned with manufactur- 
ing output, is even more dramatic because the two base years are separated by 
only ten years (see panel C of table 10.1). 
The above conveys the difficulties of making adequate comparisons (both 
cross-time and cross-country) in such a fast-moving world. We  can now  de- 
scribe this effect in more detail: 
The Gerschenkron effect can be defined as follows: For any pair of countries 
(or years), a quantity index (GDP, industrial production, consumption, etc.) 
for a given country (year) at another country’s (year’s) prices will be higher 
than the index at that country’s (year’s) own prices. 
Thus, the Soviet UnionAJnited States GDP ratio as measured at U.S. prices 
will always be higher than that measured at Soviet prices, just as the United 
StatesEoviet Union GDP ratio computed at Soviet prices will come out higher 
than the same ratio at U.S. prices. For growth rates (both positive and nega- 
tive), the effect would result in the following: the growth rates would always 274  Yuri Dikhanov 
be higher when computed at the beginning year’s prices, and lower if estimated 
at the concluding year’s prices. 
Given the above examples, it is in no way surprising that the CIA results are 
different from the official growth rates (7.2 vs.  3.7 percent for 1913-50  for 
Soviet industry). But it is surprising that they differ so little given the fact that 
the official industrial growth rates were computed at 1926/27 prices. 
Against this background, it does not seem unreasonable for the indexes cal- 
culated on the basis of different methodologies to differ that much.* In such 
comparisons involving time series, the main emphasis should be on making 
the time series for two countries completely compatible from a methodolog- 
ical perspective, that is, using a set of common prices and identical index num- 
bers. The common price vector would enforce compatibility between growth 
rates and levels at different time points. One cannot calculate growth rates of 
Soviet manufacturing at 1987 Soviet prices and U.S. manufacturing at  1987 
U.S. prices and expect both growth rates to be compatible. The 1987 Soviet 
prices may be even further from the 1987 U.S. prices than are the 1967 U.S. 
own prices. However, from panel C of  table 10.1, we know what just a ten- 
year difference in base years can do to the growth rates. 
10.2  Contrasting CIA and Goskomstat Estimates of GDP Levels 
It is known that the CIA estimates portrayed the Soviet Union more favor- 
ably than Goskomstat itself the CIA had 49 percent for the GNP ratio for 1990 
(Fisher index), with a corresponding GNP per capita number of 42.5 percent. 
For 1987, Goskomstat estimated the GNP ratio at 58 percent (64  percent for 
net material product [NMP]). However, that estimate was based on U.S. prices. 
For the Fisher index, the GNP ratio would amount to approximately 45.5 per- 
cent,3  which in turn would render the GNP per capita ratio for 1987 at around 
39 percent. Again, extrapolated to 1990, this ratio would become 36 percent. 
Actually, one can observe that the corresponding Goskomstat GNP per capita 
number was rather close to the 1990 ICP  result^:^ 31.6 percent. On the other 
2. That an index employs a certain index number formula does not automatically make it right 
or wrong. That index just cannot be considered in conjunction with another index utilizing some 
other aggregation procedure. Only the differences  between indexes that are irreducible to the index 
number problem (i.e., distortion in basic physical units, misrepresentation of  prices) can be re- 
garded as “real” differences. 
3. The ratio of  ruble- and schilling-based GDP estimates for the Soviet Union (the Paasche- 
Laspeyres spread) in the 1990 Soviet Union-Austria  comparison was around 0.617 (ECE 1994). 
That makes the ratio of  the Fisher to the Schilling-based numbers 0.785 = (0.617)ln. I use the 
same ratio in a shortcut to render the Goskomstat U.S.  dollar-based  results into the Fisher index. 
In reality, the PLS could be even more dramatic in a Soviet Union-United  States direct comparison 
because usually, the more countries are different in GDP per capita terms, the further the Paasche 
index stands from the Laspeyres. 
4.  Linked through the  1985 Hungary-Soviet  Union comparison to the Austria-United  States 
pair, the Soviet Uniomnited States GDP per capita ratio stood at 38 percent in that year. Extrapo- 
lated to 1990, this ratio would have decreased to 35 percent. A part of the difference between this 275  Soviet Performance from the Gerschenkron Perspective 
Table 10.2  CIA Soviet UniodUnited States Ratios Contrasted to Official 
Goskomstat Estimates (%) 
1960  1987 
CIA (GNP, Fisher)  48  53 
Goskomstat (NMP, U.S. dollars)  58  64 
Source: CIA estimates from Becker (1994). Goskomstat estimates from statistical  yearbooks from 
various years. 
hand, it is not improbable that, being naturally focused on Soviet military ex- 
penditures, the CIA could have been exaggerating their value. In this case, in 
fact, apart from an understandable disagreement over Soviet military expendi- 
tures, the CIA and Goskomstat numbers come out surprisingly similar. More- 
over,  the changes in Soviet UnionAJnited States GDP ratios over time ac- 
cording to official Soviet estimates correlate very closely with those from the 
CIA sources (see table  10.2): both  stipulate a  10 percent  increase during 
1960-87. 
10.3  Conclusions 
It would be very useful indeed to make the CIA archives containing docu- 
mentation on the estimates of Soviet performance available to the public. That 
would enable further finessing of  Soviet historical time series. However, it 
would be no less important for the United States to continue full participation 
in the ICP to remain an anchor in the future long-term economic comparisons 
(in a broader sense and not only with the Soviet UnionRussia). The ICOP 
(International  Comparisons of Output and Productivity) project begot by Mad- 
dison can serve as an extremely valuable tool to cross-check the ICP results 
from various benchmarks and national growth rates. Finally, as can be seen, the 
methodological index number issues are of paramount importance and need to 
be thoroughly addressed in any such comparison to make the results compati- 
ble across countries. 
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